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Malay Muslim Patani is a majority resident in southern Thailand. They have a long history of the 
insurgency against the Thai regime lasted since the 18th century. This literature study analyzes the 
context of Malay Muslim Patani insurgency pattern against the Thai regime in the post-revolution 
1932. In The Post-revolution 1932, the Malay Muslim Patani insurgency pattern was likely to 
strengthen in response to the policies of the Thai regime repressive to insurgency issues and strict 
assimilation policies that demanded an all-ethnic identity in Thailand to be the True ethnic Thai 
identity. For the last decade, the concept of Islam as the political identity has increasingly made it 
a determination to establish the Malay identity of Patani Islam as the basis of the insurgency 
movement.  To realize the sustainable peace in Malay Muslim Patani area can be through a 
religious approach. 
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Abstrak 
Melayu Islam Patani adalah penduduk mayoritas di wilayah Selatan Thailand. Mereka memiliki 
sejarah panjang insurjensi terhadap rezim Thai dari sejak abad ke-18. Dalam studi literatur ini 
menganalisis pola insurjensi Melayu Islam Patani terhadap rezim Thai pasca revolusi tahun 1932. 
Pasca revolusi tahun 1932, pola insurjensi Melayu Islam Patani cenderung menguat dalam 
menanggapi kebijakan represif rezim Thai, dimana kebijakan asimilasinya yang menuntut identitas 
semua etnis di Thailand menjadi identitas Thai seutuhnya. Dalam  satu dekade terakhir, konsep 
Islam sebagai identitas politik yang menjadi identitas Melayu Patani Islam sebagai dasar gerakan 
insurjensi. Melalui pendekatan keagamaan dapat diupayakan dalam mewujudkan perdamaian yang 
berkelanjutan di daerah Melayu Islam Patani  
 




The most significant number of Muslims in Thailand was derived from ethnic Malays. Malay 
Muslims in Thailand not only live in the southern region, exactly three provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
and Narathiwat, but also live in the Satun, Songkhla, Trang, Krabi, and Phuket. In the historical 






records, once present the Kingdom of Patani as the ruler of the Malay Islamic Kingdom of Patani. 
The king of Siam finally conquered the Kingdom of Patani in 1786 A.D.  After the Anglo-Siamese 
treaty 1904 and 1909, it is increasingly apparent that the Malay region Patani became part Integral 
to the domination of the Thai Buddhist kingdom is not a Malay kingdom anymore (Forbes, 1982). 
The Thai government took a policy by dividing Patani's Malay Muslim territories into seven 
provinces, in a centralized administrative system. In each of these lands, a king or Chao Muang 
under the supervision of Songkhla. With this change, the Malay Islamic kingdom ended in Patani. 
The Malay territory of Patani was only one of the newly formed lands that entered the power of 




Source : https://flagspot.net/flags/th(s.html 
 
The Thai regime implemented a policy of assimilation of Malay Muslim residents in the 
south to Muslim Thai, after World War II. This policy was a model of the Patani Malay insurgency 
movement in the early 20th century (Gross, 2007).  The change of the Thai governance system, 
from the type of absolute monarchy to the constitutional monarchy, began in the revolution in June 
1932, with the People's Party (Khana Ratsadon) as the pioneer of its movements. A coalition party 
consisted of bureaucrats, princes, and military officers. The revolution spawned a democratic 
system in Thailand and was legally formally written in the Royal Constitution of Siam 1932 
(Preechasinlapakun, 2013). 
The policy process of Thai identity assimilation began on a high level during the regime of 
Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram, an ultranationalist who was also a military officer involved in 
the 1932 revolution. Phibun Songkhram ruled in 1938. Phibun Songkhram adopted a policy of 
assimilation following the system of the previous regime, which forced the various minority 






cultures in Thailand, becoming the mono-ethnic Thai as part of the national identity (Croissant, 
2007). 
Phibun Songkhram soon launched a campaign to eliminate Malay-Muslim cultural identity 
for Thai nationalism. The degradation of Muslim Malay identity in all fields, including education, 
language, clothing, and religious practices. Over the last decade, the intensity of the violent 
separatist movement is increasingly growing in the southern provinces of Thailand. The Malay 
historical background of Patani and policy of government assimilation, forming Patani's Malay 
identity with Islam as the source of its primary resistance. In 1947, it appeared in the Malay region 
of Patani a separatist movement to fight for the independence of Patani with the title Malay 
Movement of Patani Raya (Malay Grand League Patani). Then  it was emerged Barisan Nasional 
Liberation Patani (BNPP) in 1959, since then, it began to clash between the parties who wanted 
the independence of Patani and security forces in the province of southern Thailand (Gross, 2007). 
The intensity of conflict between Malay Muslim rebels Patani and Thai security forces 
decreased slightly during the 1960s and 1970s. During the reign of Prem Tinsulanonda became 
Prime Minister in March 1980, the government supported the Cultural Rights and Freedom of 
Malay Muslims, offering the amnesty for the rebels that were all done for the plan of economic 
development for the southern Thailand region (Croissant, 2007). 
The transition to a better democracy in Thailand offers the opportunity for Malay Muslims 
to be active in political participation, including political parties, such as the Democratic Party. 
Around the year of 1990, the democratic government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai 
(Democratic Party) formulated a national security policy for the province of the border in the south, 
with a model of development approach as security (Gross, 2007) 
The Southern border area also conducted security cooperation between the Government of 
Thailand and Malaysia-which in the past seemed to close the eyes on the activities of Malay Patani 
insurgency in their region. This development contributed significantly to the decrease in the level 
of Malay Muslim insurgency Patani (Croissant, 2007).  
The pockets of resistance remained, but most observers agreed that the rebellion had been 
shrinking and relatively quiet in the late 1990s. However, in the past few months, the first ten days 
of August 2016, the systematic attack of 50 of the bombs in the border province in southern 
Thailand. The indication of violence is closely related to the implementation of the referendum on 
August 7, 2016. The insurgent also wrote the anti-constitutional graffiti in 18 locations to influence 
public opinion in the south to oppose the Constitution (Engvall, 2016).  
Based on the background of the problem, the authors attempted to analyze the context of 




This literature study is a search for texts related to research topics. The literature is emphasized on 
the results of research and books discussing the Patani Malay community in Thailand. Besides, 
there are also readings and observations of various reference sources related to the topic. Data were 
analyzed by comparing between each text and then by linking it to the reality of the research 










RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Background on the Emergence of Insurgency Issues in Malay Region patani.  
In the History Book of Malay Kingdom Patani (SKMP), written by Ibrahim Syukri- an original 
Patani, who understands the local traditions and culture of Patani Malay. The idea of Malay 
nationalism influences SKMP. SKMP was published in the late 1940's, not in Patani but Pasir 
Putih, Kelantan, Malaysia. The book is contrary to the Thai regime's stance on many political issues 
concerning Malay Patani (Syukri, 1985)  
Another point of view regarding the background of insurgency in southern Thailand. The 
role of the domestic Islam of Thailand constrained and hindered in many ways, as the Thai 
government dominated by Buddhist cosmology. Especially during the intensive period  "Build 
Nation " From 1902 – the year 1957, the Thai government aggressively promotes trust  "Buddhism, 
" "King, " and  "Nation," and anyone who does not apply these same values not considered as part 
of a valid Thai citizen (Pitsuwan, 1985). 
Conversely, Patani Muslims who did not apply these new norms often viewed with 
suspicion and humiliation. They were even identified or branded as separatism that threatens the 
survival of national development. For the Patani region, this cultural identity was forced to be 
enforced by the Thai government. This threat was a focal point for disagreements and resilience in 
Patani. Some Malay Muslim requested in the southern Thailand province to the Thai regime gave 
them the right to identity of Malay culture and their Islamic beliefs as they had practiced for 
generations (Pitsuwan, 1985). 
Thai Government's efforts to integrate Thai identity as a national identity are the same as 
the cultural breakup of many Malay Muslim perspectives. In many ways, this threat of cultural 
disintegrating has triggered a reaction that is rooted in fear and resistance and has led to Muslim 
Patani to perform harder results.  
In the studies of the Malays in the Patani region in the 1950s, saw Patani Malays trapped 
among the Thai regime's policy on education and cultural assimilation on one side and Malay 
separatism as a form of Sentiments on the other hand (Fraser, 1966). Unlike the Malays in other 
peninsular countries, Patani Melayu maintains the traditional power source of their sultan, as the 
Sultanate of Patani has been abolished by the Siamese regime in the early second century Twenty. 
With the loss of the Sultanate as a marker of the Malay communal identity Patani, they then took 
the religion as a substitute for the previously prevailing collective identity (Jory, 2007) 
Modern Thai state has always been ambivalent in its policy towards the southern part of 
Thailand. As is Christian, Islam is recognized, and as a religious minority, and Buddhism is never 
officially designated as a state religion. Remained in the concept of the Thai regime's power when 
the Triad ' nation, religion, and King ' was involved, it was clear that Buddhism was a reference 
religion. All school books tend to articulate morals and ethics in the context of Buddhism. Muslim 
children can only learn about Islam from the Madrasah.  
At a further level, the Muslim minority also faces the question of whether they are really ' 
Thai.' At the time of King Chulalongkorn, the term ' Muslim Thai ' began to popularize. It is 
presumably allowed them to remain ' Thai ' as well as ' Muslims ' although this was a matter of 
their Malay ethnic role. In the 1930s and 1940 's the Thai regime with cultural assimilation policy 
increasingly aggressive, limiting the use of Malay customary clothing and Malay language. Of 
course, this policy was fought by the Malays, who lived in the southern part of Thailand (Ricklefs 
et al., 2013). 






The concept of 'nation' (chat) entered into force during Chulalongkorn's reign, when he 
sought to build loyalty among his people with diverse ethnic groups. To minimize racial gaps and 
introduce the idea of the monarchy of a 'Thai' nation, the term 'Orang Lao' transformed into a 
northeastern Thai,' 'Orang Melayu' changed 'Thai Muslims' and so on.  ‘Triad' of the nation, religion 
and King' is a base of Thai nationalism, which more clearly and consistently articulated during the 
successor of Chulalongkorn, Vajiravudh (reigned 1910-1925) though-the latter has existed since 
the end of the 19th century (Ricklefs et al., 2013). 
The post-World War II period, people living in the southern provinces of Thailand, 
demanded a separate regional government and the Islamic court system in addition to the official 
Malay language use at the local level and throughout the system Constitutional state in a broader 
context. Some voices demanded Patani be independent or parted and then join Malaysia. The 
military government, who took over power at the end of 1947, rejected most of these demands and 
was cracking down on the strict resistance in this area. Then, it was born a separatist movement 
that lived today with a variety of different names (Gross, 2007). 
In 1960 the Thai government used a combination of military repression and ' soft power ' 
which was the increase in the presence of the royal family in the south after the construction of the 
palace in Narathiwat province. During Prem's reign, the situation was relatively stable, but the 
potential for conflict was not eliminated. However, throughout 1950-an, the primary concern of 
the Thai government in the context of integration is not the ' Southern Muslims ' but the Chinese 
community. Chinese is a community that is ethnically stronger than ethnic Malays (Ricklefs et al., 
2013). 
To some extent, the political articulation of the Malay ethnic consciousness in Patani can 
as a response to the economic sub-ordinations, culture, and politics of Muslim society as a result 
of Internal colonization. In this opinion, Thailand is a paradigmatic case of Internal colonization, 
where the economic gap very far in between central (Bangkok) and rural hinterland has resulted in 
economic retardation in the south (Croissant, 2007). 
 
Patani Malay Muslim insurgency post-revolution 1932 
The Siamese revolution that occurred in June 1932 was a bloodless coup conducted by young 
nationalist groups, military leadership, and civilian people. They did not fight the king as a symbol 
of the state of Thailand but against Conservative government ministers. Their goal is to turn the 
traditional absolute monarchy into a limited constitutional monarchy (Gross, 2007). 
The revolution also finally brought the country's name change to Thailand in 1939, looking 
at all Thai citizens to have fully participated in the institution and culture of Thai people. Although 
Thailand's new leader of nationalism policy is almost entirely secular, Thai cultural cosmology is 
a Theravada Buddhist cosmology. This condition makes Malay Muslims Patani feel more 
marginalized in this new regime (LePoer, 1989). 
During World War II, Japan invaded Southeast Asia at the end of 1941, taking over French 
Indochina, the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies in the early 1942 years. 
The Thai ultra-nationalist regime led by Phibun Songkhram, allied with Japan and allowed Japan 
to enter the Malay Peninsula from the north in 1941 at the beach near Pattani (Gross, 2007). 
As a gift for the cooperation, Thailand received mastery from Japan during the war that was 
part of the territory in Laos, Cambodia, and Burma as well as four Malay regions, namely the states 
of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis. Most Malays during World War 2, collaborated with 






Japan for independence from the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. Much of Pattani Malays 
collaborated with the British against the Thai regime.  
The leader of this movement was Tengku Mahmud Mahfdeen, the second son of Patani's 
last Sultan, Tengku Abdul Kadir, who had been exiled by the Thai government. He played an 
essential role in recruiting Malay volunteers with the power of 136 personnel in guerrilla warfare 
activities in Malaya to fight Japan (Gross, 2007).  
Tengku Mahmud hoped that Britain's success in the war would result in the release of Patani 
from the Thai government. At the beginning of November 1945, shortly after the end of World 
War 2, seven prominent members of Malay ruling elite Patani filed a formal petition to London. 
They were requesting  that the British government might have right to let go of our country and 
ourselves from the pressures of Siam, because we do not want to stay longer under the Siamese 
rule (Gross, 2007). 
It was probably the most appropriate time for Malay Muslim Patani to realize their wishes 
separating themselves from Thailand. The British government considered the proposal seriously; 
even some members of the British government gave a positive response as a form of punish 
Thailand for his attitude that helped Japan in the war. But in the end, the proposal was raw without 
any clarity.  
The change of government in Thailand in 1944, where new leaders can gradually reject the 
old regime agreement with Japan, even quietly gives free access to Allied agents operating in 
Thailand. Thus, Thailand has effectively turned the side during the war and could claim it was no 
longer a hostile force with the allies shown at the beginning of the War. 
In January 1946, Britain and Thailand had signed a post-war treaty in which the latter 
approved the return of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, as well as the Burmese section to 
England (Gross, 2007). Furthermore, the direct role of the United States, which in the final stages 
of World War II began to see Thailand as the key to the strategic importance of Western parties in 
south east Asia to block the communists in the north.  
A few years later, in the governance of Thailand, precisely in 1960, the government carried 
out strict supervision of Madrasah in the Malay region of Patani. All boarding schools are registered 
with the Ministry of Education and add a secular curriculum, although there is no prohibition on 
the use of Malay language as instruction language, the use of the Thai style as an additional 
language in all schools in Malay region Patani. The enrolled schools are entitled to receive state 
funds and are subject to state inspections. It also includes the obligation to provide a list of teachers 
and student names. Unlisted Madrasah is considered illegal. As a result, 150 madrasahs closed 
from the estimated 355 schools that existed in 1971 — in the year 2004, allegedly residing 127 
registered Madrasah still operating in the Malay region in southern Thailand (Madmarn, 1999). 
The Madrasah system became the primary means used by Malay living in the south, to 
preserve and disseminate the teachings of Islam and Malay culture. On the other hand, since the 
1960-an emerged a pattern of the Malay militant Patani agenda as a struggle to preserve Malay 
heritage in different ways in the southern region of Thailand, whose goal is apparent towards the 
Malay separatism model insurgency. The group includes BRN (National Revolution Line), GMIP 
(Pattani Islamic Mujahidin Movement), and PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization). BNP 
= BIP – an umbrella organization whose movement of political coordination is slightly better than 
the group Separatist — believed to have indirect military operations in the southern regions of 
Thailand. Three factions left, New PULO is believed to be the smallest. GMIP may have a full area 
of activity, but the largest of the three main camps inevitably is BRN (Gross, 2007). 






The separatist groups in South Thailand have recently done a method of struggle with a low 
intensity of risk and more sophisticated tactics. These actions include combustion, bombing, 
military attacks, and attacks on state officials, law enforcement personnel, local government 
officials, teachers, and Buddhist monks (Croissant, 2007). 
The use of suicide bomb methods as a choice weapon of Islamic fighters since 1980, not so 
widespread. Since the year 2004, militants have also adopted new bombing tactics. They have 
focused on government and private buildings, Royal Thai Police members, and other 
representatives of the central government. Motorcycle bombs have been a liked method in this 
attack. While before mid-2004, insurgents were focusing on Buddhists, the targeting gradually 
shifted towards civilian security personnel (Croissant, 2007). 
 





BRN (Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional) 
 
1960 Separate in three wings: 1. BRN Congress, the 
main military arm, 2. BRN coordinates focus on 
political agitation and urban sabotage; 3. BRN 
scholars, as a most significant and most organized 






1995 The Afghan War veterans formed it near the 
Association for the KMM (Malay mujahidin 
Group) in Malaysia. 
PULO (Pattani United 
Liberation Organisation) 
 
1968 Active in guerrilla operations until the early 
1990s; Secular organizations have no military 
ability. 
New PULO 1995 It was divided as a faction of disagreements from 
PULO in 1995 but formed a tactical alliance with 




=Barisan Islam Pembebasan 
Pattani–Pattani 
 
1963 Received support from traditional nobility as well 
as from the religious elite; The goal is not only 
the autonomy or integration of Patani with 
Malaysia but the full independence and 





1989/97 It is established in 1989, the revival in 1997 as an 
umbrella organization for the loose political 
coordination between BRN, PULO, New PULO, 
GMIP. 
Source : (Croissant, 2007) 
 
While there is no evidence of a coordinated strategy between the various separatist faction 
groups in the southern regions of Thailand, but the mass-based separatist movement is well 






organized. Along with the increased outrage of the Malay Muslim community against the Thai 
regime, it became an excellent opportunity to recruit new members of the separatist group in the 
future. It is undeniable that there is a tendency for criminal action to be performed by secessionist 
groups. They seem to operate in a gray zone, by committing criminals on one side and ethnic or 
religious consciousness on the other. There are several persons involved as drug dealers (Croissant, 
2007). 
External group involvement from outside Malay region Patani, such as Al Qaeda and 
Jemaah Islamiyah in Thailand, can only provide training facilities, funds, motivation, and 
encouragement to Muslim rebels in southern Thailand (Liow, 2004). No involvement of Al-Qaeda 
or congregation Islamiyah has found in the form of active personal participation. 
If there is an appraisal that says that the Malay Muslim separatist group Patani in southern 
Thailand as subordinate to transnational terrorist groups, it was a rash and very premature 
judgment. Despite evidence of relief for insurgents from South Asia, and some interconnectedness 
between insurgents and the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in Malaysia, no clear and decisive 
evidence shows direct involvement of The external groups in Malay insurgency Patani (Croissant, 
2007).  In the period of conflict from 2004 until the year 2014. In the early years of violence, four 
years from January 2004 to December 2007, riots escalated considerably increased in temperature. 
Some well-coordinated attacks characterize some violent incidents.  In June 2006, rebel parties 
were performing simultaneous attacks at 54 places in the three southern terminus provinces, most 
of which used self-modified explosives. In August 2006, disruption occurred in more than 122 
locations in the south of tip provinces at the same time, ranging from bombing, combustion, tire 
burning. In September 2006, housing bombings and tourist areas in 7 places in the city of Hat Yai, 
the capital of Songkla province with a death toll of 5 people and more than 60 injured people 
(Jitpiromsri, 2014). 
After the government in 2007 conducted a policy deemed more cooperative in southern 
Thailand, the de-escalation effect of violence in the region gradually showed the outcome. Violent 
incidents decline significantly. Governments, particularly the military, have achieved some success 
at suppressing insurgency and keeping the peace for some time. However, the implementation of 
this policy that tends to promote military operations still has not touched the crucial problems in 
southern Thailand, especially the economic, social development issues. Based on a survey 
conducted by Prince of Songkla University shows that the most severe difficulties experienced by 
Thai society in the south are drug abuse, unemployment, rebellion, and poverty (Jitpiromsri, 2014).   
 
CONCLUSION 
Historical facts speak that the ethno-religious conflict in Thailand's southernmost province is not 
constant; sometimes, they can live peacefully alongside other governments and ethnic groups. 
Observing the Malay Muslim Patani's insurgency pattern in the Post-Revolution 1932 till now day, 
Muslim Society only rebelled when regarded as their cultural and religious identity as a threat by 
the Thai regime (Croissant, 2007). 
The previous Thai government's using the aggressive approach to counter-insurgency was 
thus sacrificing the democratic system and adding to the fertile Malay Muslims Patani insurgency 
movement. The theme of peace and practical solutions to the problems that cause the emergence 
of insurgency issues in southern Thailand, especially for Malay Muslims Patani is a 
priority.Experience in Thailand with communist uprisings in the 1970 and the early 1980s show 
that solutions to the problem of rebellion were to give a fair portion of economic and political 






fields. In contrast, military solutions were secondary solutions. The insurgency in Malay Muslim 
Patani as part of the efforts to preserve the traditions and political interests is a part of the most 
authentic identity for Malay Muslims Patani in southern Thailand that is different from most Thai 
people, especially the difference In terms of language and religion. The repressive act further 
encouraged the strong Malay insurgency movement of Patani against the Thai regime, mostly in 
the last decade.  
Considering the political identity model played in pattern of the Malay Muslim Patani 
insurgency is Islam as a religious political identity. The need of the active role of ASEAN such as 
Indonesia as a country with largest Muslim population in Southeast Asia, as a sustainable mediator 
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